Contemporary Conflict Resolution

The prevention, management and transformation of deadly conflicts

Third Edition

OLIVER RAMSBOTHAM, TOM WOODHOUSE
AND HUGH MIALL

polity

CHAPTER 1

Introduction to Conflict Resolution: Concepts and Definitions

In this third edition of our book we bring the survey of the conflict resolution field up to date at the beginning of the second decade of the twenty-first century. Conflict resolution as a defined specialist field came of age in the post-Cold War era. It also found itself face to face with fundamental new challenges, many of which have come into even sharper focus since the first and second editions of this book.

Why a Third Edition?

The first edition of the book (1999) was written at a time when, despite setbacks, conflict resolution approaches in peacekeeping, peacemaking and peacebuilding were widely seen for the first time to be central in global politics in the context of what US President George Bush senior had (somewhat reluctantly) called a 'new world order'. His successor, Bill Clinton, and UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan both broadly subscribed to what we identify as the 'cosmopolitan' worldview shared by many if not most of the founders of the conflict resolution field. The aim of the first edition of the book was to explain what this meant. The second edition (2005) coincided with the apogee of the 'neo-con' reaction, associated particularly with the administration of President George W. Bush junior. The 'global war on terror' had come to dominate the stage, and conflict resolution appeared to have been marginalized and its cosmopolitan values either dismissed or co-opted and discredited. The aim of the second edition was to rescue the conflict resolution enterprise from this entanglement, and to reassert its distinctive nature and contribution in the first decade of the twenty-first century. This third edition (2011) appears at a particularly uncertain moment in world history, with the promise of a new US administration once again ready to embrace conflict resolution approaches in wider foreign policy formulation, but with mounting challenges from rising non-western powers (notably China), increasingly complex links between state failure and international terrorism, a severely shaken global economy, and embroilment in Afghanistan and Iraq continuing to wreak a fierce backlash against the whole concept of a 'liberal peace' – in which conflict resolution is often seen to be implicated. The aim of the third edition is to clarify the role of conflict resolution at the beginning of the second decade of the century and to redefine its cosmopolitan values in this

uncertain and complex environment. Our central argument is that systemic complexity of this kind may make conflict resolution more difficult, but for the same reason renders it all the more relevant and urgent.

As a defined field of study, conflict resolution started in the 1950s and 1960s. This was at the height of the Cold War, when the development of nuclear weapons and the conflict between the superpowers seemed to threaten human survival. A group of pioneers from different disciplines saw the value of studying conflict as a general phenomenon, with similar properties whether it occurs in international relations, domestic politics, industrial relations, communities or families or between individuals. They saw the potential of applying approaches that were evolving in industrial relations and community mediation settings to conflicts in general, including civil and international conflicts.

A handful of people in North America and Europe began to establish research groups to develop these new ideas. They were not taken very seriously. The international relations profession had its own categories for understanding international conflict and did not welcome the interlopers. Nor was the combination of analysis and practice implicit in the new ideas easy to reconcile with established scholarly institutions or the traditions of practitioners such as diplomats and politicians.

Nevertheless, the new ideas attracted interest, and the field began to grow and spread. Scholarly journals in conflict resolution were created. Institutions to study the field were established, and their number rapidly increased. The field developed its own subdivisions, with different groups studying international crises, internal wars, social conflicts and approaches ranging from negotiation and mediation to experimental games.

By the 1980s, conflict resolution ideas were increasingly making a difference in real conflicts. In South Africa, for example, the Centre for Intergroup Studies was applying the approaches that had emerged in the field to the developing confrontation between apartheid and its challengers, with impressive results. In the Middle East, a peace process was getting under way in which negotiators on both sides had gained experience both of each other and of conflict resolution through problem-solving workshops. In Northern Ireland, groups inspired by the new approach had set up community relations initiatives that were not only reaching across community divides but were also becoming an accepted responsibility of local government. In war-torn regions of Africa and South-East Asia, development workers and humanitarian agencies were seeing the need to take account of conflict and conflict resolution as an integral part of their activities.

By the closing years of the Cold War, the climate for conflict resolution was changing radically. With relations between the superpowers improving, the ideological and military competition that had fuelled many regional conflicts was fading away. Protracted regional conflicts in Southern Africa, Central America, and East Asia moved towards settlements. It seemed that the UN could return to play the role its founders expected.

The dissolution of the Soviet Union brought to a close the long period in which a single international conflict dominated the international system. Instead, internal conflicts, ethnic conflicts, conflicts over secession and power struggles within countries became the norm in the 1990s. These reflected not so much struggles between competing centres of power, of the kind that had characterized international conflict for most of the 350 years since the peace of Westphalia, as the fragmentation and breakdown of state structures, economies and whole societies. At their extreme, in parts of Africa, the new wars witnessed the return of mercenary armies and underpaid militias, which preyed on civilian populations, and were fed as much by what were meant to be overt flows of international aid as by covert criminal international networks.

In this new climate, the attention of scholars of international relations and comparative politics turned to exactly the type of conflict that had preoccupied the conflict resolution thinkers for many years. A richer cross-fertilization of ideas developed between conflict resolution and these traditional fields. At the same time, practitioners from various backgrounds were attracted to conflict resolution. International statesmen began to use the language, and international organizations such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the Organization of African Unity (OAU) set up conflict resolution mechanisms and conflict prevention centres. A former president of the United States, Jimmy Carter, became one of the most active leaders of a conflict resolution non-govermental organization (NGO). The Nyerere Foundation was established with comparable aims for Africa. Development and aid workers, who had earlier tended to see their function as 'non-political', now became interested in linking their expertise to conflict resolution approaches, because so many of the areas with which they were most concerned were conflict zones – 'complex humanitarian emergencies' were seen also to be 'complex political emergencies'. A similar cross-fertilization took place with international peacekeepers. Overseas development ministries in several countries set up conflict units and began funding conflict prevention and resolution initiatives on a significant scale. International financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank also took on conflict prevention roles. The UN secretary-general declared the prevention of violent conflict to be a central goal for the international community in the new millennium. How to achieve a 'peaceful settlement of disputes' between states was a familiar theme in the international relations and strategic studies literature and had always been part of the stock-in-trade of international diplomacy. Less familiar was the challenge to statist international organizations of managing non-state conflicts.

A greater degree of impact, however, also brought greater scrutiny and the development of searching critiques from different quarters. The second and third editions of our book have been largely prompted by these. Conflict resolution had always been controversial, both in relation to outside disciplines and internally among its different protagonists and schools. It also drew

persistent fire from critics at different points along the political and intellectual spectrum, from neo-realists to neo-Marxists. After the high hopes of the early 1990s, three developments in particular took the gloss off what were no doubt often unrealistic expectations of rapid results. First, there were the difficulties that international interveners encountered in chaotic war zones, such as in Bosnia (1992–5) and Somalia (1992–3). A number of analysts pointed to the impact of globalization on the weakening of vulnerable states, the provision of cheap weaponry suitable for 'asymmetric war', and the generation of shadow economies that made 'new wars' self-perpetuating and profitable. Conflict resolution was seen to be incapable of addressing this nexus. Second, there was the collapse of the Israeli–Palestinian 'Oslo' peace process with the launch of the second intifada or uprising in September 2000. The Oslo process had been hailed at the time as an example of success for classic conflict resolution approaches. Third came the shock of the destruction of the World Trade Center and the attack on the Pentagon on 11 September 2001, together with the kaleidoscope of events that followed, summed up as the 'global war on terror' (GWOT). Western global hegemony had elicited a global *jihadist* reaction. What possible answer could conflict resolution have to what was seen as the lethal combination of 'rogue' or 'failed' states, trans-border crime, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and the fanatical ideologues of international terrorism?

Behind these political challenges lay more precisely focused intellectual challenges. Three of these in particular will be engaged with in the course of this book. First a variant of the traditional realist criticism of conflict resolution, in which international politics is seen as a struggle between antagonistic and irreconcilable groups with power and coercion as the only ultimate currency, and 'soft power' approaches of conflict resolution dismissed as ineffective and dangerous – the crushing of Tamil military resistance by government forces in Sri Lanka in 2009 is seen as a salutary example here. Second a variant of the traditional Marxist criticism, which sees 'liberal' conflict resolution as naive and theoretically uncritical, since it attempts to reconcile interests that should not be reconciled, fails to take sides in unequal and unjust struggles, and lacks an analysis within a properly global perspective of the forces of exploitation and oppression. In general, in response to both of these criticisms, whereas realist theory and much Marxist theory considers violence as unavoidable and integral to the nature of conflict, such determinism is rejected in conflict resolution. Here there are always seen to be other options, and direct violence is regarded as an avoidable consequence of human choice. Our third set of critics, exemplified in Paul Salem's 'Critique of western conflict resolution from a non-western perspective' (1993; see also Salem, 1997), argue that the 'western' assumptions on which conflict resolution rests are not applicable universally.

In response to these and other criticisms, this book argues in Part II that, on the contrary, the developing tradition of thinking about conflict and conflict

resolution is all the more relevant as the fixed structures of sovereignty and governance break down. All over the world, societies are facing stresses from population growth, structural change in the world economy, migration into cities, environmental degradation and rapid social change. Societies with institutions, rules or norms for managing conflict and well-established traditions of governance are generally better able to accommodate peacefully to change; those with weaker governance, fragile social bonds and little consensus on values or traditions are more likely to buckle. Strengthening the capacity of conflict resolution within societies and political institutions, especially preventatively, is a vital part of the response to the phenomena of warlordism and ethnonationalism. We argue that conflict resolution has a role to play, even in war zones, since building peace constituencies and understandings across divided communities is an essential element of humanitarian engagement. We argue that conflict resolution is an integral part of work for development, social justice and social transformation that aims to tackle the problems of which mercenaries and child soldiers are symptoms. We argue for a broad understanding of conflict resolution, to include not only mediation between the parties but also efforts to address the wider context in which international actors, domestic constituencies and intra-party relationships sustain violent conflicts. We maintain that, although many of the recent theories and practices of conflict resolution may have been articulated more vociferously in the West, their deep roots reach into far older world traditions from which they draw their inspiration. Indeed, every culture and society has its own version of what is, after all, a general social and political need. The point is not to abandon conflict resolution because it is western, but to find ways to enrich western and non-western traditions through their mutual encounter. And, finally, this applies all the more urgently to the phenomenon of international terrorism. Conflict resolution teaches that short-term denial strategies on their own will fail unless accompanied by and embedded within middle-term persuasion strategies, long-term prevention strategies, and international coordination and legitimation strategies. We will look at this in more detail at the end of chapter 11. And we will discuss the theoretical debate between conflict resolution and its critics more fully in a new chapter – chapter 19.

Conflict Resolution Models

Here we offer a brief initial sketch of the conflict resolution field, followed by an introduction to some of the best-known models that have been found to be useful in it. This introduction is selective and indicative, not systematic, let alone exhaustive. The rest of the book will fill in the gaps.

Conflict is a universal feature of human society. It takes its origins in economic differentiation, social change, cultural formation, psychological development and political organization – all of which are inherently conflictual – and becomes overt through the formation of conflict parties, which come

to have, or are perceived to have, mutually incompatible goals. The identity of the conflict parties, the levels at which the conflict is contested, and the issues fought over (scarce resources, unequal relations, competing values) may vary over time and may themselves be disputed. Conflicts are dynamic as they escalate and de-escalate, and are constituted by a complex interplay of attitudes and behaviours that can assume a reality of their own. Third parties are likely to be involved as the conflict develops, and may themselves thereby become parties in an extended conflict. An important point to note from the outset is how early theorists in the field such as Morton Deutsch (1949, 1973) distinguished between *destructive* and *constructive* conflict, suggesting that the former was to be avoided but the latter was a necessary and valuable aspect of human creativity. This remains key for understanding the normative orientation of the conflict resolution field as a whole, as will be emphasized below.

The new field of conflict resolution in the 1950s defined itself in relation to the challenge of understanding and transforming destructive human conflicts of this kind. In contrast to older established fields, such as international relations, conflict resolution was to be:

- *multilevel*: analysis and resolution had to embrace all levels of conflict: intra-personal (inner conflict), interpersonal, intergroup (families, neighbourhoods, affiliations), international, regional, global, and the complex interplays between them;
- *multidisciplinary*: in order to learn how to address complex conflict systems adequately, the new field had to draw on many disciplines, including politics, international relations, strategic studies, development studies, individual and social psychology, etc.;
- *multicultural*: since human conflict is a worldwide phenomenon within an increasingly intricate and interconnected local/global cultural web, this had to be a truly cooperative international enterprise, in terms of both the geographical locations where conflict is encountered and the conflict resolution initiatives deployed to address them;
- *both analytic and normative*: the foundation of the study of conflict was to be systematic analysis and interpretation of the 'statistics of deadly quarrels' (polymology), but this was to be combined from the outset with the normative aim of learning how better thereby to transform actually or potentially violent conflict into non-violent processes of social, political and other forms of change;
- *both theoretical and practical*: the conflict resolution field was to be constituted by a constant mutual interplay between theory and practice: only when theoretical understanding and practical experience of what works and what does not work are connected can properly informed experience develop.

Conflicts have been variously defined in relation to 'fights, games and debates' (Rapoport, 1960). This remains controversial. For example, some have

used 'conflict' to refer both to 'consensual' conflicts over interests (disputants want the same thing) and to 'dissensual' conflicts over values (disputants do not want the same thing) (Aubert, 1963); others, however, have called the former 'disputes' that require settlement and have reserved the term 'conflict' for deeper struggles over unsatisfied human needs that require resolution (Burton, 1990a). We will not enter this discussion here, and are happy to use the term 'conflict' to refer to the widest set of circumstances in which conflict parties perceive that they have mutually incompatible goals – although we do see a difference between conflicts, on the one hand, and sporting encounters, economic competitions and legal cases, in which the rules of contestation are not themselves called into question, on the other.

But we must at the outset address the current debate within the field between *conflict resolution* and *conflict transformation* – although we will then set this aside as well. In this book we see conflict transformation as the deepest level of the conflict resolution tradition, rather than as a separate venture, as some would prefer (Väyrynen, 1991; Rupesinghe, 1995; Jabri, 1996; Francis, 2002; Lederach, 2003). John Paul Lederach, for example, downgrades conflict resolution in comparison with conflict transformation on the grounds that it is content-centred rather than relationship-centred, aims at immediate agreement rather than long-term process, and is committed only to de-escalation rather than also including escalation to pursue constructive change (2003: 33). This is something of a caricature of the field, and is reminiscent of the way in which in an earlier period John Burton caricatured 'dispute settlement' in comparison with the deeper process of 'conflict resolution', which he defined in much the same way as Lederach and others now define conflict transformation. In our view it does not matter in the end which label is used as the umbrella term (candidates have included 'conflict regulation', 'conflict engagement' and 'conflict management' as well as conflict resolution and conflict transformation), so long as the field itself is coherent enough to contain the substance of what is being advocated in each case. We believe that the field does retain its coherence, that it is best left intact, and that conflict resolvers and conflict transformers are essentially engaged in the same enterprise – as shown in titles of books such as Dukes's *Resolving Public Conflict: Transforming Community and Governance* (1996). We continue to use conflict resolution as the generic term here for four reasons. First, because it was the earliest term used to define the new field (the 1957 *Journal of Conflict Resolution*). Second, because it is still the most widely used term among analysts and practitioners – recent examples are Morton Deutsch and Peter Coleman's edited volume *The Handbook of Conflict Resolution* (2000), Peter Wallensteen's *Understanding Conflict Resolution* (2007), and *The Sage Handbook of Conflict Resolution* (2009), edited by Jacob Bercovitch, Victor Kremenyuk and William Zartman. Third, because 'conflict resolution' is the term that is most familiar in the media and among the general public. Fourth because the term 'conflict transformation' is in itself inherently indeterminate unless further qualified – transformation in

which direction? As explained in the preface, conflict resolution has from the start encompassed 'conflict settlement' at one end of the spectrum and 'conflict transformation' at the other. As is made explicit historically in chapter 2, and theoretically in chapter 19, there have always been tensions between the two.

Framework Models

We begin by offering a simplified model of Johan Galtung's seminal thinking on the relationship between conflict, violence and peace. As described in chapter 2, Galtung was one of the founders of the field, and the breadth of his understanding of the structural and cultural roots of violence is a corrective to those who caricature conflict resolution as purely relational, symmetrical or psychological.

Galtung's models of conflict, violence and peace

In the late 1960s Johan Galtung (1969; see also 1996: 72) proposed an influential model of conflict that encompasses both symmetric and asymmetric conflicts. He suggested that conflict could be viewed as a triangle, with contradiction (C), attitude (A) and behaviour (B) at its vertices (see figure 1.1). Here the contradiction refers to the underlying conflict situation, which includes the actual or perceived 'incompatibility of goals' between the conflict parties generated by what Chris Mitchell calls a 'mis-match between social values and social structure' (1981a: 18). In a symmetric conflict, the contradiction is defined by the parties, their interests and the clash of interests between them. In an asymmetric conflict, it is defined by the parties, their relationship and the conflict of interests inherent in the relationship. Attitude includes the parties' perceptions and misperceptions of each other and of themselves. These can be positive or negative, but in violent conflicts parties tend to develop demeaning stereotypes of the other, and attitudes are often influenced by emotions such as fear, anger, bitterness and hatred. Attitude covers emotive (feeling), cognitive (belief) and conative (desire, will) elements. Analysts who emphasize these subjective aspects are said to have an *expressive* view of the sources of conflict (for example: 'a social conflict exists when two

Figure 1.1 *Galtung's models of conflict, violence and peace*

or more parties believe they have incompatible objectives'; Kriesberg 1982: 17). Behaviour is the third component. It can involve cooperation or coercion, gestures signifying conciliation or hostility. Violent conflict behaviour is characterized by threats, coercion and destructive attacks. Analysts who emphasize objective aspects such as structural relationships, competing material interests or behaviours are said to have an *instrumental* view of the sources of conflict (for example: there is conflict 'whenever incompatible actions occur . . . an action that is incompatible with another action prevents, obstructs, interferes, injures or in some way makes the latter less likely to be effective'; Deutsch 1973: 10).

Galtung argues that all three components have to be present together in a full conflict. A conflict structure without conflictual attitudes or behaviour is a latent (or structural) one. Galtung sees conflict as a dynamic process in which structure, attitudes and behaviour are constantly changing and influencing one another. As the dynamic develops, it becomes a manifest conflict formation, as parties' interests clash or the relationship they are in becomes oppressive. Parties then organize around this structure to pursue their interests. They develop hostile attitudes and conflictual behaviour. And so the conflict formation starts to grow and intensify. As it does so, it may widen, drawing in other parties, deepen and spread, generating secondary conflicts within the main parties or among outsiders who get sucked in. This often considerably complicates the task of addressing the original, core conflict. Eventually, however, resolving the conflict must involve a set of dynamic changes that mean de-escalation of conflict behaviour, a change in attitudes, and a transformation of the relationships or clashing interests that are at the core of the conflict structure.

A related idea due to Galtung (1990) is the distinction between direct violence (children are murdered), structural violence (children die through poverty) and cultural violence (whatever blinds us to this or seeks to justify it). We end direct violence by changing conflict behaviour, structural violence by removing structural contradictions and injustices, and cultural violence by changing attitudes. These responses relate in turn to broader strategies of peacekeeping, peacebuilding and peacemaking (see figure 1.1).

Galtung defined 'negative peace' as the cessation of direct violence and 'positive peace' as the overcoming of structural and cultural violence as well. These are slightly deceptive terms.

Negative peace is not to be despised (the term 'negative' is a bit unfortunate in this respect). At an intrapersonal level, anyone who has been unable to sleep through grief, remorse (for the past), anxiety (for the future), etc., will know the blessings of a peaceful mind. The same goes at the family level for anyone who has suffered violence or abuse, at a community level, discrimination, persecution, 'ethnic cleansing', genocide, or, at the international level, the terrible destruction of war. Over all of this since 1945 has hung the threat of nuclear holocaust.

On the other hand, negative peace on its own can be coupled with repression, deprivation, exploitation, injustice. Pax Romana, pax Britannica and pax Sovietica were all associated with the forcible crushing of legitimate human aspirations. As the Latin historian of the conquest of Britain in the first century AD said of the victorious Roman general: 'he made a wasteland and called it peace'. There was negative peace in Hungary after 1956. There is negative peace today (more or less) in Tibet.

Positive peace, in contrast, includes the key ideas of 'legitimacy' and 'justice'. An unjust structure or relationship in this terminology is not a peaceful one. In order to achieve positive peace, therefore, injustice must be removed. This also operates at all the different levels, from unjust economic relations between 'North' and 'South', through unjust political relations between majority and minority groups within a country, to unjust personal relations between individuals. It applies to all the various types of 'differences' that distinguish sets of human beings: differences of race (the idea that some races are 'superior' to others), gender (male domination), class (perpetuation of socio-economic advantage and disadvantage through birth, not merit), etc. At an intrapersonal level positive peace goes beyond absence of anxiety and embraces the idea of deep inner peace through integrity (wholeness) of being, physical, emotional, spiritual. Some believe that 'inner' peace of this kind is the ultimate underpinning of lasting world peace.

Positive peace is also deeply problematic, however. For example, 'injustice' usually amounts to 'perceived injustice', and we are immediately plunged into a highly controversial and complicated arena, which virtually includes the whole of politics. Nothing is more characteristic of violent conflict than the fact that all parties genuinely believe that they are victims of injustice, and that therefore 'justice' is on their side. Both pray to God for victory. Linked to this is the well-known paradox that many of those who battle against perceived injustice themselves use force in order to do so. Again, there is a danger here of doctrinaire activists 'forcing people to be free' (Rousseau's phrase). The fact that people may not 'realize' that they are exploited (in the eyes of the activist) is interpreted as 'brainwashing' or 'false consciousness'. It is seen as 'the problem of the happy slave'. The conclusion may then be to try to coerce them into revolt. Behind all of this, the problem of imputation can be seen to be a deep and questionable one. On the other hand, there undoubtedly *is* exploitation and injustice, much of which is institutionalized and also culturally and psychologically internalized. The exploiters may even be as unaware as anyone else of the overall situation and, indeed, genuinely believe that there is no injustice.

A conflict escalation and de-escalation model

Conflicts are dynamic and can develop and change at astonishing speed. They can also take long periods of time to gestate unnoticed before they suddenly erupt into overt violence. The process of conflict escalation is complex and

Figure 1.2 *Conflict escalation and de-escalation*

unpredictable. New issues and conflict parties can emerge, internal power struggles can alter tactics and goals, and secondary conflicts and spirals can further complicate the situation. The same is true of de-escalation, with unexpected breakthroughs and setbacks changing the dynamics, with advances in one area or at one level being offset by relapses at others, and with the actions of third parties influencing the outcome in unforeseen ways. Here we offer the simplest model in which escalation phases move along a normal distribution curve, from the initial *differences* that are part of all social developments, through the emergence of an original *contradiction* that may or may not remain latent, on up through the process of *polarization* in which antagonistic parties form and the conflict becomes manifest, and culminating in the outbreak of direct *violence* and *war* (see figure 1.2). As we will see in chapter 3, escalation models such as this are popular with those who try to find objective criteria for measuring statistical changes in conflict levels in different countries from year to year. They are also used by those who attempt to match appropriate conflict resolution strategies to them (Glasl, 1982; Fisher and Keashly, 1991).

The hourglass model: a spectrum of conflict resolution responses

Here we combine Galtung's ideas on conflict and violence with escalation/de-escalation phases to produce the 'hourglass' model of conflict resolution responses (Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, 1999a) (see figure 1.3). The hourglass represents the narrowing of political space that characterizes conflict escalation (top half of the hourglass model) and the widening of political space that characterizes conflict de-escalation (bottom half of the hourglass model). As the space narrows and widens, so different conflict resolution responses become more or less appropriate or possible. Following Roger Fisher and Loraleigh Keashly (1991), this is a *contingency* and *complementarity* model, in which 'contingency' refers to the nature and phase of the conflict

Conflict transformation	Difference	Cultural peacebuilding
Conflict settlement	Contradiction	Structural peacebuilding
Conflict settlement	Polarization	Peacemaking
	Violence	Peacekeeping
Conflict containment	WAR	War limitation
	Ceasefire	Peacekeeping
Conflict settlement	Agreement	Peacemaking
	Normalization	Structural peacebuilding
Conflict transformation	Reconciliation	Cultural peacebuilding

Note: in de-escalation phases conflict resolution tasks must be initiated at the same time and are nested. They cannot be undertaken sequentially as may be possible in escalation phases – see chapters 5 and 8. We suggest that what is sometimes called deep peacemaking (which includes reconciliation) is best seen as part of cultural peacebuilding.

Figure 1.3 *The hourglass model: conflict containment, conflict settlement and conflict transformation*

and 'complementarity' to the combination of appropriate responses that need to be worked together to maximize chances of success in conflict resolution. Conflict transformation is seen to encompass the deepest levels of cultural and structural peacebuilding. Conflict settlement (which many critics wrongly identify with conflict resolution) corresponds to what we call 'elite peacemaking' – in other words, negotiation or mediation among the main protagonists with a view to reaching a mutually acceptable agreement. Conflict containment includes preventive peacekeeping, war limitation and post-ceasefire peacekeeping. War limitation is made up of attempts to constrain the fighting geographically, to mitigate and alleviate its intensity, and to bring about its termination at the earliest possible moment. In this model we distinguish between the elite peacemaking that forms the sub-stance of conflict settlement and the deeper levels of peacemaking (including reconciliation and education) that are better seen as part of cultural peacebuilding.

In chapter 5 (Preventing Violent Conflict) we will look at the top half of the hourglass model. In chapter 6 (Containing Violent Conflict: Peacekeeping) we will look at the conflict containment components. In chapter 7 (Ending Violent Conflict: Peacemaking) we will look at the conflict settlement components. And in chapters 8–10 (Postwar Reconstruction; Peacebuilding; Reconciliation) we will look at the bottom half of the hourglass model.

Table 1.1 indicates the range of complementary processes and techniques relevant to the hourglass model of escalation and de-escalation offered in this book and elaborated below.

The conflict tree

Another influential framework model is the 'conflict tree', as developed and applied in particular in the Responding to Conflict Programme at Birmingham (see figure 1.4).

Classical Ideas

Here is a selection of classic conflict resolution models. We have seen above how conflict is an intrinsic and inevitable aspect of social change. It is an expression of the heterogeneity of interests, values and beliefs that arise as new formations generated by social change come up against inherited constraints. But the way we deal with conflict is a matter of habit and choice. It is possible to change habitual responses and exercise intelligent choices.

Conflict approaches

One typical habit in conflict is to give very high priority to defending one's own interests. If Cain's interests clash with Abel's, Cain is inclined to ignore Abel's interests or actively to damage them. Leaders of nations are expected to defend the national interest and to defeat the interests of others if they come into conflict. But this is not the only possible response.

Figure 1.5 illustrates five approaches to conflict, distinguished by whether concern for Self and concern for Other is high or low. Cain has high concern for Self and low concern for Other: this is a 'contending' style. Another alternative is to yield: this implies more concern for the interests of Other than Self. Another is to avoid conflict and withdraw: this suggests low concern for both Self and Other. Yet another is to balance concern for the interests of Self and Other, leading to a search for accommodation and compromise. And there is a fifth alternative, seen by many in the conflict resolution field as the one to be recommended where possible: high regard for the interests of both Self and Other. This implies strong assertion of one's own interest but equal awareness of the aspirations and needs of the other, generating energy to search for a creative problem-solving outcome.

Table 1.1 Conflict resolution techniques, complementarity and the hourglass model

Stage of conflict	Strategic response	Examples of responses and capacity
Difference	Cultural peacebuilding	Problem-solving Support for indigenous dispute-resolution institutions and CR training Fact-finding missions and peace commissions Culture of toleration and respect Multiple and inclusive identities
Contradiction	Structural peacebuilding	Development assistance Civil society development Governance training and institution building Human rights training Track II mediation and problem-solving Institutional capacity Constitutional and legal provision Legitimacy and social justice.
Polarization	Elite peacemaking	Special envoys and official mediation Negotiation Coercive diplomacy Preventive peacekeeping
Violence	Peacekeeping	Interposition Crisis management and containment
War	War limitation	Peace enforcement Peace support and stabilization
Ceasefire	Peacekeeping	Preventive peacekeeping Disarmament and security sector reform Confidence building and security enhancing measures Security in the community through police training
Agreement	Elite peacemaking	Electoral and constitutional reform Power sharing and de-centralization of power Problem-solving
Normalization	Structural peacebuilding	Collective security and cooperation arrangements Economic resource cooperation and development Alternative defence
Reconciliation	Cultural peacebuilding	Commissions of enquiry/truth and justice commissions Peace media development Peace and conflict awareness education and training Cultural exchanges and initiatives, sport as reconciliation Problem-solving as future imaging

Source: Fisher, S., et al. 2000. Working With Conflict, London: Zed Books, p. 29

Figure 1.4 *The conflict tree: an example from Kenya*

Source: from Katz and Lawyer, 1985

Figure 1.5 *Five approaches to conflict*

Figure 1.6 *Zero-sum and non-zero-sum outcomes*

Win–lose, lose–lose, win–win outcomes

What happens when the conflict approaches of two parties are considered together? Parties to conflicts are usually inclined to see their interests as diametrically opposed. The possible outcomes are seen to be win–lose (one wins, the other loses) or compromise (they split their difference). But there is a much more common outcome in violent conflicts: both lose. If neither is able to impose an outcome or is prepared to compromise, the conflictants may impose such massive costs on each other that all the parties end up worse off than they would have been had another strategy been adopted. In conflict resolution analysis this is found to be a much more common outcome than is generally supposed. When this becomes clear to the parties (often, regrettably, late in the day), there is a strong motive based on self-interest for moving towards other outcomes, such as compromise or win–win (defined here not as an ideal future, as is often supposed, but one in which all parties would be better off). The spectrum of such outcomes may well be wider than conflictants think. But by then positions may be so entrenched, passions so strongly aroused, and intransigent leaders so strongly ensconced that change nevertheless proves impossible. This is the all too familiar situation in intractable conflict – a topic to which we return in chapter 18.

Traditionally, the task of conflict resolution has been seen as helping parties who perceive their situation as zero-sum[1] (Self's gain is Other's loss) to reperceive it as a non-zero-sum conflict (in which both may gain or both may lose), and then to assist parties to move in the positive-sum direction. Figure 1.6 shows various possible outcomes of the conflict between Cain and Abel. Any point towards the right is better for Abel, any point towards the top is better for Cain. In the Bible, the prize is the Lord's favour. Cain sees the situation as

Table 1.2 Prisoner's Dilemma

	Cooperate	Defect
Cooperate	3, 3	0, 5
Defect	5, 0	1, 1

a zero-sum conflict: at point 1 (his best outcome) he gets the Lord's favour, at 2 (his worst) the Lord favours Abel. All the other possibilities lie on the line from 1 to 2 in which the Lord divides his favour, more or less equally, between the two brothers. Point 3 represents a possible compromise position. But it is the other diagonal, representing the non-zero-sum outcomes, that is the more interesting from a conflict resolution perspective: the mutual loss that actually occurred, at 0, when Abel was slain and Cain lost the Lord's favour, and the mutual gain that they missed, at 4, if each had been his brother's keeper.

Prisoner's Dilemma and the evolution of cooperation

Prisoner's Dilemma is a simple representation in game theory that clearly illustrates the tendency for contending strategies to end in lose−lose outcomes. Two players (prisoners accused of crime) each have two choices: to cooperate with each other (remain silent) or to defect (inform on the other). The choices must be made in ignorance of what the other will do (they are kept in separate cells). The possible pay-offs are given in table 1.2. It can be seen that, whatever choice the other may make, each player considered singly gains a higher pay-off by choosing to defect (if the other cooperates, defection earns 5 points rather than 3; if the other defects, defection earns 1 point rather than 0). So the only rational course is to defect. But this is not the best outcome for either, since, whereas mutual defection earns 1 point each, mutual cooperation would have earned both of them 3 points. So the individually rational choice turns out to deliver a mutual lose−lose outcome. The collectively rational choice is for both to cooperate, reaching the elusive win−win outcome (point 4 in figure 1.5). But if both could communicate and agree to go for mutual cooperation, how can each guarantee that the other will not subsequently defect, tempted by the 5 point prize? In this kind of social trap, self-interested parties can readily get stuck at lose−lose outcomes.

The trap depends on the game being played only once. If each move is part of a sequence of repeated games, there are possibilities for cooperative behaviour to evolve. In a well-known series of experiments, Robert Axelrod (1984) invited experts to submit programs for a Prisoner's Dilemma competition run on computer. A spectrum of 'nice' and 'nasty' strategies was submitted and each was tested in pairs against all the others in repeated interactions. The surprise clear overall winner was a simple strategy called 'Tit-for-Tat' (submitted by the conflict resolution analyst Anatol Rapoport), which began by cooperating on the first move and thereafter copied what the other had done on the

previous move. The repeated overall success of Tit-for-Tat shows, in Richard Dawkins's phrase, that, contrary to a widely held view about competitive environments of this kind (including Darwinian natural selection), 'nice guys finish first' (Dawkins, 1989: 202–33). Tit-for-Tat is not a pushover. It hits back when the other defects. But, crucially, it initially cooperates (it is 'generous'), and it bears no grudges (it is 'forgiving'). Its responses are also predictable and reliable (it has 'clarity of behaviour'). For the 'evolution of cooperation' to get going in a mêlée of competing strategies, there must be a critical if at first quite small number of initially cooperating strategies, and the 'shadow of the future' must be a long one: interaction must not be confined to just one game (for example, with one player able to wipe out another in one go). But, so long as these conditions operate, even though 'nasty guys' may seem to do well at first, 'nice guys' come out on top in the end.[2] Natural selection favours cooperation.

But even Tit-for-Tat can be locked into mutually destructive conflict if the other persists in competitive play, as happens in intractable conflicts, where mutual suspicion (lack of trust) and the security dilemma (your defence is factored into my worst-case planning as offensive threat and vice versa), as well as ideological commitment and the self-interest of intransigent parties in the continuation of the conflict, perpetuate mutual retaliation. Another way of springing the trap, therefore, is to follow the conflict resolution route and to change the players' perceptions and calculations of gain – and eventually relationship – by reframing the conflict as a shared problem. All key stake-holders must be persuaded that existing strategies lead to a lose–lose impasse and that preferable alternatives are available and will be to their advantage. Remaining irreconcilable spoilers must simply be defeated. Perceived 'pay-off' rules can be altered in ways such as:

- by increasing scarce resources (enlarging the cake);
- by offering bold gestures on less important issues in order to reduce tension and build trust (logrolling and 'graduated reciprocal' strategies);
- by creating new options not included in the original demands (brainstorming);
- by looking for 'superordinate goals' such as mutual economic gains that neither party can achieve on its own – e.g. joint membership of the EU (superordination);
- by compensating those prepared to make concessions (compensation);
- by increasing the penalties for those who are not (penalization).

So taking account of the future relationship (for example, between two communities who will have to live together) is one way out of the trap. Another is to take the social context into account. Imagine, for example, that the prisoners know that there is an agency outside which will punish them if they defect and reward them if they cooperate. This can change their pay-offs and hence the outcome. A similar change occurs if, instead of considering only their own

interests, the parties also attach value to the interests of each other: social players are not trapped.

Among recent extensions of game theory is Michael Bacharach's posthumously published *Beyond Individual Choice* (2006), which extends rational actor models to include the different ways in which agents 'frame' the problem and organize themselves into 'teams' to attain common goals.

Positions, interests and needs

How can the parties reframe their positions if they are diametrically opposed, as they often are? One of the classical ideas in conflict resolution is to distinguish between the positions held by the parties and their underlying interests and needs. For example, Egypt and Israel quarrel over Sinai. Each claims sovereignty and their positions seem incompatible. But in negotiations it turns out that Egypt's main interest is in national territorial integrity and Israel's main interest is in security. So the political space is found for what came to be the Camp David settlement. Interests are often easier to reconcile than positions, since there are usually several positions that might satisfy them. Matters may be more difficult if the conflict is over values (which are often non-negotiable) or relationships, which may need to be changed to resolve the conflict, although the same principle of looking for a deeper level of compatible underlying motives applies. Some analysts take this to the limit by identifying basic human needs (for example, identity, security, survival) as lying at the roots of other motives. Intractable conflicts are seen to result from the denial of such needs, and conflict can only be resolved when such needs are satisfied. Basic human needs are seen to be generic and non-negotiable. But the hopeful argument of these analysts is that, whereas interests may be subject to relative scarcity, basic needs are not (for example, security for one party is reinforced by security for the other). As long as the conflict is translated into the language of needs, an outcome that satisfies both sides' needs can be found (see figure 1.7).

Third-party intervention

Where two parties are reacting to each other's actions, it is easy for a spiral of hostility and escalation to develop through positive feedback. The entry of a third party may change the conflict structure and allow a different pattern of communication, enabling the third party to filter or reflect back the messages, attitudes and behaviour of the conflictants. This intervention may dampen the feedback spiral.

Although all third parties make some difference, 'pure' mediators have traditionally been seen as 'powerless' – their communications are powerful, but they bring to bear no new material resources of their own. In other situations there may also be powerful third parties whose entry alters not only the

Person A   Person B

Positions

Interests

shared
interests and
values

Needs

shared needs and fears

Source: from Floyer Acland, 1995: 50

Figure 1.7 *Positions, interests and needs*

communication structure but also the power balance. Such third parties may change the parties' behaviour as well as their communications by judicious use of the carrot and the stick (positive and negative inducement); and they may support one outcome rather than another. Of course, by taking action, powerful third parties may find themselves sucked into the conflict as a full party. Figure 1.8 illustrates how third parties may act as arbiters (with or without the consent of the conflict parties) or may try to facilitate negotiations or mediate between the parties (coercively or non-coercively).

Three faces of power

It may seem strange to call pure mediators powerless when they may provide the impetus to resolve the conflict. This is because the term 'power' is ambiguous. On the one hand, it means the power to command, order, enforce – coercive or 'hard' power. On the other, it means the power to induce cooperation, to legimitimize, to inspire – persuasive or 'soft' power. Hard power has always been important in violent conflict, but soft power may be more important in conflicts managed peacefully. Kenneth Boulding (1989) calls the former 'threat power' ('do what I want or I will do what you don't want'). Following earlier theorists of management–labour negotiations, he then further distinguishes between two forms of soft power: 'exchange power', associated with bargaining and the compromising approach ('do what I want and I will do what you want'), and 'integrative power', associated with persuasion and transformative long-term problem-solving ('together we can do something that is better for both of us'). This roughly coincides with Joseph Nye's distinction between military, economic and legitimacy power: the United States has a huge preponderance of the

Third party
Arbitration

Party A

Negotiation

Party B

Mediation
Third party

Coercive

Enforcement
Non-forcible coercion
Mediation with muscle

Non-coercive

Pure mediation
Conciliation/problem-solving
Good offices

Figure 1.8 *Coercive and non-coercive third party intervention*

Table 1.3 Three faces of power

Threat power	Exchange power	Integrative power
Destructive	Productive	Creative
productive	destructive	productive
creative	creative	destructive
Source: from Boulding, 1989: 25		

first, a large share of the second, but only a limited and highly ambiguous measure of the third (Nye, 2002, 2004). Nye concludes that soft power is more important, even from a self-interested perspective, than many unreconstructed realists may suppose. Conflict resolvers try to shift emphasis away from the use of threat power and towards the use of exchange and integrative power (see table 1.3).

Third parties such as politicians and governments may use all these forms of power. In terms of third-party intervention (see figure 1.7) it is helpful to distinguish between powerful mediators, or 'mediators with muscle', who bring their power resources to bear, and powerless mediators, whose role is confined to communication and facilitation. Track I diplomacy involves official governmental or intergovernmental representatives, who may use good

offices, mediation, and sticks and carrots to seek or force an outcome, typically along the win–lose or 'bargaining' line (between the points 1, 3 and 2 in figure 1.5). Track II diplomacy, in contrast, involves unofficial mediators who do not have carrots or sticks. They work with the parties or their constituencies to facilitate agreements, encouraging the parties to see their predicament as lying along the lose–lose to win–win line (between points 0, 3 and 4 in figure 1.5) and to find mutually satisfactory outcomes.

Symmetric and asymmetric conflicts

So far we have been considering conflicts of interest between relatively similar parties. These are examples of *symmetric* conflicts. Conflict may also arise between dissimilar parties, such as between a majority and a minority, an established government and a group of rebels, a master and his servant, an employer and her employees. These are *asymmetric* conflicts. Here the root of the conflict lies not in particular issues or interests that may divide the parties, but in the very structure of who they are and the relationship between them. It may be that this structure of roles and relationships cannot be changed without conflict.

Classical conflict resolution, in some views, applies only to symmetric conflicts. In asymmetric conflicts the structure is such that the top dog always wins, the underdog always loses. The only way to resolve the conflict is to change the structure, but this can never be in the interests of the top dog. So there are no win–win outcomes, and the third party has to join forces with the underdog to bring about a resolution.

From another point of view, however, even asymmetric conflicts impose costs on both parties. It is oppressive to be an oppressor, even if not so oppressive as to be oppressed. There are costs for the top dogs in sustaining themselves in power and keeping the underdogs down. In severe asymmetric conflicts the cost of the relationship becomes unbearable for both sides. This then opens the possibility for conflict resolution through a shift from the existing structure of relationships to another.

The role of the third party is to assist with this transformation, if necessary confronting the top dog. This means transforming what were unpeaceful, unbalanced relationshi-ps into peaceful and dynamic ones. Figure 1.9 illustrates how the passage from unpeaceful to peaceful relationships may involve a temporary increase in overt conflict as people become aware of imbalances of power and injustice affecting them (stage 1, education or 'conscientization'), organize themselves and articulate their grievances (stage 2, confrontation), come to terms in a more equal way with those who held a preponderance of power over them (stage 3, negotiation) and finally join in restructuring a more equitable and just relationship (stage 4, resolution). There are many ways in which this can be approached without using coercion. There is the Gandhian tactic of 'speaking truth to power', influencing and persuading

Unpeaceful relations   Peaceful relations

Source: from Curle, 1971, and Lederach, 1995

Figure 1.9 *Transforming asymmetric conflicts (I)*

the power-holders. Then there are the tactics of mobilizing popular move-ments, increasing solidarity, making demonstrations of resolve, establishing a demand for change. Raising awareness of the conflict among those who are external or internal supporters of the top dog may start to weaken the regime (as did, for example, the opponents of apartheid in South Africa). The unequal power structure is unbalanced and is held up by props of various kinds; remov-ing the props may make the unbalanced structure collapse. Another tactic is to strengthen and empower the underdogs. The underdogs may withdraw from the unbalanced relationship and start building anew – the parallel institutions approach. Non-violence uses soft power to move towards a more balanced relationship.

New Developments in Conflict Resolution

The new patterns of major armed conflict that became prominent in the 1990s suggested a more nuanced model of conflict emergence and transformation. This model sees conflict formations arising out of social change, leading to a process of violent or non-violent conflict transformation, and resulting in further social change in which hitherto suppressed or marginalized individu-als or groups come to articulate their interests and challenge existing norms and power structures. Figure 1.10 shows a schematic illustration of phases of conflict and forms of intervention that may be feasible at different stages. A schematic lifecycle of conflict sees a progression from peaceful social change,

Figure 1.10 *Conflict dynamics and conflict resolution*

to conflict formation, to violent conflict, and then to conflict transformation and back to peaceful social change. But this is not the only path. The sequence can go from conflict formation to conflict transformation and back to social change, avoiding violence. Or it can go from conflict formation to violent conflict back to the creation of fresh conflicts.

In response, there has been a differentiation and broadening in the scope of third-party intervention. Whereas classical conflict resolution was concerned mainly with entry into the conflict itself and with how to enable parties to violent conflict to resolve the issues between them in non-violent ways, the contemporary approach is to take a wider view of the timing and nature of intervention. In the 1990s came Fisher and Keashly's (1991) complementarity and contingency model of third-party intervention, mentioned earlier, with its attempt to relate appropriate and coordinated resolution strategies (conciliation, mediation, peacekeeping) to conflict phases (segregation, polarization, violence). Lederach's (1997) model of conflict resolution and conflict transformation levels has also been influential, with its emphasis on 'bottom-up' processes and the suggestion that the middle level can serve to link the other two (see figure 1.11). Francis (1994) has developed Curle's original asymmetric conflict model, embedding classic conflict resolution strategies within wider strategies for transforming conflicts of this kind (see figure 1.12). Encarnacion et al. (1990) have elaborated models of third-party intervention in order to stress the way external parties may come to be core parties as their level of involvement increases, and to emphasize the importance of 'embedded parties' from inside the conflict who often play key roles in expediting moves to resolution (see figure 1.13). William Ury (2000) has developed an influential model, which relates what he terms 'third side roles' in conflict resolution to escalation/de-escalation conflict stages (see figure 1.14). This is discussed further in chapter 14 (p. 000).

Elite

High-level
negotiations

Top
leaders

Problem-solving
workshops

Middle-level
leaders

Local peace
commissions

Grassroots leaders

Society

Figure 1.11 *Actors and approaches to peacebuilding*

Unbalanced power

oppression,
injustice,
latent conflict

awareness,
conscientization

mobilization,
empowerment

changed
attitudes

negotiation,
mediation

confrontation,
overt conflict

changed
relationship,
new power
balance

agreed
relationship

Balanced power

Figure 1.12 *Transforming asymmetric conflicts (II)*

Source: from Encarnacion et al., 1990: 45

Figure 1.13 *The gradient of conflict involvement*

Third side roles to prevent escalation to destructive violence:
Containing roles: Witness, Referee, Peacekeeper
Resolving roles: Mediator. Arbiter Equalizer, Healer
Preventing roles: Provider, Teacher, Bridge-builder

Source: The Third Side: Harvard University Global Negotiation Project: www.thirdside.org

Figure 1.14 *William Ury's third side roles*

In general there has been a shift from seeing third-party intervention as the primary responsibility of external agencies towards appreciating the role of internal 'third parties' or indigenous peacemakers. Instead of outsiders offering the fora for addressing conflicts in one-shot mediation efforts, the emphasis is on the need to build constituencies and capacity within societies and to learn from domestic cultures how to manage conflicts in a sustained way over time. This suggests a multitrack model in place of the earlier Track I and Track II models mentioned above, in which emphasis is placed on the importance of indigenous resources and local actors – what we might call Track III (see

Figure 1.15 *Multitrack conflict resolution*

figure 1.15). There is a shift towards seeing conflict in its context (associated sometimes with structuralist, constructivist or discourse-based views of social reality). In even broader terms, it is useful to see both triggers for conflict and transformers of conflict operating at the same time across four interrelated spheres. It is this interpenetration of ecological, global, societal and personal space that in our view increasingly characterizes the conflict field (Galtung 1996) (see figure 1.16).

For all these reasons it is helpful to locate contemporary armed conflicts within a framework that encompasses different levels, from international (global, regional, bilateral), through state, down to societal level (identity groups, individuals). This will be exemplified in chapter 4. Most major armed conflicts today are hybrid struggles that spill across the *international*, *state* and *societal* levels. These are *trans-border conflicts*, which is what makes them so hard to resolve or transform. The 64–year conflict in Kashmir, for example, is most

1 = Ecological, 2 = Global 3 = Societal 4 = Personal

Figure 1.16 *Spheres of cosmopolitan conflict resolution*

simply seen as an interstate conflict between India and Pakistan going back to
the time of partition after 1947. But it is deeply affected by changes at both the
global level (the ending of the Cold War, the *jihadist* reaction against western
hegemony, the war on terror) and the regional level (the Afghan wars), as well
as by economic, political and ideological struggles at sub-state provincial and
local levels – including the cross-cutting influence of the wider diasporas. It
is at the *state level* that these two dimensions (external, internal) in the end
mainly impact, because of the ambivalent nature of the state, at the same time
the main actor on the international scene and also (in theory) the main satis-
fier of internal social needs. Conflict transformation has to operate simultane-
ously at all these levels – from the global to the local – which goes far towards
defining the task of what in Part II we call *cosmopolitan conflict resolution*.

Terminology

Although terminology is often confusing, with the same terms used in differ-
ent ways both within the academic literature and in general usage, we offer
the following definitions of how key terms are used in this book.

By *conflict* we mean the pursuit of incompatible goals by different groups.
This suggests a broader span of time and a wider class of struggle than armed
conflict. We intend our usage here to apply to any political conflict, whether
it is pursued by peaceful means or by the use of force. (Some theorists, notably
John Burton, have distinguished between disputes about negotiable interests

that can be settled by compromise and more deep-seated conflicts that involve human needs and can be resolved only by removing underlying causes.)

Armed conflict is a narrower category denoting a conflict where parties on both sides resort to the use of force. It is notoriously difficult to define, since it can encompass a continuum of situations ranging from a military overflight or an attack on a civilian by a single soldier to an all-out war with massive casualties. The research community has identified a number of thresholds and rules for deciding what to count. We consider these definitions in chapter 3.

Violent conflict, or *deadly conflict*, is similar to armed conflict, but also includes one-sided violence such as genocides against unarmed civilians. We mean direct, physical violence. We acknowledge the strong argument in peace research for broadening the concept of violence to encompass exploitative social relations that cause unnecessary suffering, but prefer to use the now well-known term 'structural violence' for this.

Contemporary conflict refers to the prevailing pattern of political and violent conflicts at the beginning of the twenty-first century; *contemporary armed conflict* refers only to those that involve the use of force.

Conflict settlement means the reaching of an agreement between the parties to settle a political conflict, so forestalling or ending an armed conflict. This suggests finality, but in practice conflicts that have reached settlements are often reopened later. Conflict attitudes and underlying structural contradictions may not have been addressed.

Conflict containment involves peacekeeping and war limitation (geographical constraint, mitigation and alleviation of intensity, and termination at the earliest opportunity).

Conflict management, like the associated term 'conflict regulation', has been used as a generic term to cover the whole gamut of positive conflict handling. Here we understand it to refer in a more limited way to the settlement and containment of violent conflict.

Conflict resolution is a more comprehensive term, which implies that the deep-rooted sources of conflict are addressed and transformed. This implies that behaviour is no longer violent, attitudes are no longer hostile, and the structure of the conflict has been changed. It is difficult to avoid ambiguity, since the term is used to refer both to the process (or the intention) to bring about these changes and to the completion of the process. A further ambiguity is that conflict resolution refers to a particular defined specialist field (as in 'conflict resolution journals'), as well as to an activity carried on by people who may or may not use the term or even be aware of it (as in 'conflict resolution in Central America'). Nevertheless, these two senses of the term are tending to merge.

Conflict transformation is a term which for some analysts is a significant step beyond conflict resolution, but which in our view represents its deepest level. As clarified in figure 1.3, it implies a deep transformation in the institutions and discourses that reproduce violence, as well as in the conflict parties

themselves and their relationships. It corresponds to the underlying tasks of structural and cultural peacebuilding. Where this becomes manifest across global cultures, linking the personal, societal, global and ecological spheres (figure 1.16), we call this *cosmopolitan conflict resolution*.

Negotiation is the process whereby parties seek to settle or resolve their conflicts. *Mediation* involves the intervention of a third party; it is a voluntary process in which the parties retain control over the outcome (pure mediation), although it is sometimes combined with positive and negative inducements (mediation with muscle). *Conciliation* or *facilitation* is close in meaning to pure mediation, and refers to intermediary efforts to encourage the parties to move towards negotiations, as does the more minimalist role of providing good offices. *Problem-solving* is a more ambitious undertaking in which parties are invited to reconceptualize the conflict with a view to finding creative, win–win outcomes. *Reconciliation* is a longer-term process of overcoming hostility and mistrust between divided peoples.

We use *peacemaking* in the sense of moving towards settlement of armed conflict, where parties are induced to reach agreement voluntarily – for example, as envisaged in Chapter VI of the UN Charter on the 'Pacific settlement of disputes' (Article 33). *Peacekeeping* (traditionally with the consent of the conflict parties) refers to the interposition of international armed forces to separate the armed forces of belligerents, often now associated with civil tasks such as monitoring and policing and supporting humanitarian intervention. *Peace-enforcement* is the imposition of a settlement by a powerful third party. *Peacebuilding* underpins the work of peacemaking and peacekeeping by addressing structural issues and the long-term relationships between conflictants. With reference to the conflict triangle (see figure 1.1), it can be suggested that peacemaking aims to change the attitudes of the main protagonists, peacekeeping lowers the level of destructive behaviour, and peacebuilding tries to overcome the contradictions which lie at the root of the conflict (Galtung, 1996: 112).

Finally, following the original lead of Morton Deutsch, as noted above, it is important to recognize that the aim of conflict resolution is not the elimination of conflict, which would be both impossible (conflict is inherent in social change) and, as is made clear in Curle's model of the transformation of asymmetric conflicts (see figure 1.9), is often undesirable (there may need to be more, not less, conflict in struggles against injustice). Rather, the aim of conflict resolution is to transform actually or potentially violent conflict into peaceful (non-violent) processes of social and political change. This is an unending task as new forms and sources of conflict arise.

Structure of the Book

The structure of Part I of the book is based on the idea that, having described the evolution of the conflict resolution field (chapter 2), examined the statistical

bases for analysis (chapter 3) and characterized the nature of contemporary conflict (chapter 4), broad distinctions can then be made between the tasks of preventing violent conflict (chapter 5), mitigating or alleviating violent conflict once it has broken out while at the same time searching for ways of terminating it (chapter 6), ending violent conflict (chapter 7), and ensuring that conflict does not subsequently regress to violence but is lastingly transformed into peaceful processes of political and social change, including reconstruction (chapter 8), peacebuilding (chapter 9) and reconciliation (chapter 10). We are not suggesting that conflicts necessarily go through these phases, but we think that this is the simplest expository structure to adopt. Part I essentially continues to update and expand the first edition of this book. As such, it aims to serve as a comprehensive introduction to the conflict resolution field, showing how it applies across the spectrum in major contemporary conflicts.

Part II is also reorganized and updated, and in addition contains five new chapters. Its aim is to relate what has been described in Part I to the broader issues and challenges that define the transformative task of conflict resolution at the beginning of the new decade. This covers the main debates about the whole nature of conflict resolution that are now further defining the field. Conflict resolution remains open to these critiques – from the political right (realist), from the political left (critical, post-structural), from gender perspectives (feminist), from various non-western (sometimes non-liberal) traditions – and wants to go on learning from them. But in Part II the authors also explicitly defend the conflict resolution tradition, including both its 'settlement' and 'transformation' dimensions, from criticism that seems too sweeping and dismissive. Conflict resolution does not ignore 'hard power', but argues that hard power on its own is usually in the end ineffective, even counter-productive. And conflict resolution does not uncritically reinforce existing hegemonic exclusions and dominations or turn a blind eye to alterity and difference, but continues to grapple with the perpetual challenge of determining if and how emancipatory struggles can be conducted non-violently.

Chapter 11 sets the conceptual framework for Part II, notably the key cosmopolitan task of linking global to local manifestations of contemporary conflict, and ends with an exposition of a conflict resolution approach to terror and global order. Chapter 12 is a new chapter on environmental conflict resolution. Chapter 13 (Gender and Conflict Resolution), chapter 14 (Conflict Resolution and the Ethics of Intervention) and chapter 15 (Culture, Religion and Conflict Resolution) are updated and rewritten. Three more new chapters – on conflict resolution in art and popular culture (chapter 16), conflict resolution, the media and the communications revolution (chapter 17), and managing linguistic intractability (chapter 18) – follow, with an emphasis on the importance of global inclusion and the engagement of young people in the cosmopolitan conflict resolution enterprise. Chapter 19 sums up the current theoretical debate in a series of 'conversations' with realist, critical theoretic, post-structural and non-western critics. The book ends by

considering upcoming conflict formations and responses and the main tasks facing the emerging 'fifth generation' in the conflict resolution field as a result (chapter 20).

Recommended reading

Bercovitch et al. (2009); Burton and Dukes (1990a); Cheldelin et al. (2003); Deutsch and Coleman (2000); Fisher (1997); Jacoby (2008); Kriesberg (1998a); Mitchell and Banks (1996); Sandole (1999); Wallensteen (2007); Webel and Galtung (2007).